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Resumen: El financiamiento público de la educación obedece a 
imperfecciones en los mercados de capital. De manera 
similar, se cree que el gobierno debe mantener un nivel 
adecuado de capital público que facilite la producción 
privada. En este artículo, se examina la implicación de 
bienestar y de política de estas inversiones en una ver-
sión del modelo de Diamond (1965). Se argumenta que 
en un esquema donde la generación actual es decisiva, 
se observa una subinversión significativa en infraestruc-
tura y educación con respecto al equilibrio Ramsey. 
Abstract: Government financing of schooling is necessitated by 
capital market imperfections. Governments are also res-
ponsible for maintaining a stock of public capital that 
enters private production function. In this paper the 
welfare implications and politics of these investments 
are examined in a version of Diamond (1965) growth 
model. It is argued that in decentralized environments 
where the working generation is decisive each period 
significant underinvestment in both schooling and in-
frastructure will be observed relative to the Ramsey 
equilibrium. 
* We would like to thank José Pagan for helpful comments. 
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1. Introduction 
The declining quality of US schools and the deterioration of the nations 
infrastructure are among the most important public policy concerns in the 
US today. Schooling is supposed to provide younger generations with the 
skills necessary to compete in the labor market. Investments in public 
capital are required to boost the productivity of private factors of produc-
tion. Both may be necessary to sustain US economic growth and enhance 
the countrys international competitiveness. 
Government investments in both schooling and public (infrastruc-
ture) capital in the US are substantial. State, local and federal spending 
for schools amounts to over 5 percent of GNP, and spending for infra-
structure is even higher (about 7 percent of GNP). In the case of school-
ing, some argue that government intervention is necessitated by capital 
market imperfections, externalities, and redistribute considerations. In 
particular, it is well known that capital constrained families underinvest 
in the human capital of their children (see Becker, 1991 and Friedman, 
1982). These families underinvest even if schooling has no external 
effects; however, the magnitude of underinvestment is more pro-
nounced if, as argued by Lucas (1988), the social returns to human 
capital accumulation exceed the private returns by a substantial margin. 
In the case of public capital, the role of the government emerges from 
the need to establish the rules of political and economic interactions 
(national defense, property rights, rules for bankruptcy, legal enforce-
ability of contacts, etc.). These government services and some private 
goods traditionally provided by governments (highways, fire stations, 
etc.) are best modeled as inputs in production and raise the productivity 
of privately owned factors.
1 
One of the most important questions in growth economics is the 
relative contribution of each of these two types of government invest-
1 The basic argument for government provision of private goods is that there may 
be certain benefits that are not appropriable; that is, producers may not be able to exclude 
some agents from consuming these services. Another argument suggests that there may 
be economies of scale and, efficient provision of the services may require a monopolist; 
perhaps the government is an entity that could be easy monitored (Aschauer, 1989). 
Empirical studies have shown no conclusive evidence that government provision of 
services is inefficient (Stiglitz, 1988, Chp. 7). For example, Aschauer (1990) found a 
positive effect on output from government non-military investment spending. RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS 5 
ment in the growth process. Existing models of endogenous growth 
have either addressed government investments in human and public 
capital separately (see e.g. Lucas, 1988) or have combined the two 
concepts of capital in a single concept of generalized capital (see e.g. 
Barro, 1990). This is appropriate if the aim of the analysis is to obtain 
broad qualitative conclusions about the effects of government invest-
ment on economic growth. The distinction between the two is important 
when implementing of these theories and, in particular, in assessing the 
relative size of taxes required to finance each type of public investment. 
Both types of public investments reallocate resources away from cur-
rent private consumption and capital accumulation and impose substan-
tial burdens on a generation already weary of high taxes, large deficits 
and large taxpayer bailouts. This view is best described in Meltzer 
(1992): "Looking at the budget deficit alone makes it seem that federal 
investment in infrastructure has the same effect as hiring more regula-
tors". However, as Meltzer (1992) adds: "The effects on the economy of 
these two ways of spending money are, however, quite different. If the 
governments investment is effective, private sector productivity is en-
hanced". 
This paper addresses the public finance problem of providing funds 
for schooling and for public capital in a lifecycle growth framework 
which makes explicit the choices faced by the current generation of 
taxpayers. Diamond's (1965) model is extended to incorporate both 
decisions about human capital accumulation and investment in infra-
structure capital. Three factors of production —labor, private capital 
and public capital— and three generations per period —students, work-
ers, and retirees— are distinguished. Labor skills are determined by 
investments in schooling. These investments require the student's own 
time and schooling services (mainly those of teachers and instructional 
capital). If the capital markets were perfect or students could compen-
sate their parents for the cost of these services, investments in human 
capital would be undertaken up to the point where the marginal return of 
human capital equals the cost of funds. These alternatives are not feasi-
ble in today's society, so that in absence of government financing of 
schooling there would be underinvestment in human capital. Govern-
ment funds for schooling are intergenerational transfer from workers 
and retirees to students. These funds are typically raised via distortion-
ary taxes. This distortion is independent from —and can be traded 6 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
against— the capital market distortion described above. The level or 
subsidies to schooling is determined by the social welfare function of 
the government. 
Provision of funds for schooling can be modeled as an intergenera-
tional transfer from wage and capital income earners to students. The 
size of this transfer depends on the nature of intergenerational politics in 
the society. Becker and Murphy (1988), for example, adopt the view 
that the expansion of public funding of schools and the institution of 
social security are components of a social compact between generations 
—an arrangement in which the working generation pays for educating 
the young and in exchange receives old age support in the form of social 
security. They argue that this arrangement mimics patterns of intergen-
erational cooperation that formerly existed within families in more tra-
ditional societies. These patterns in essence represented implicit 
contracts between generations and were enforced by social custom or 
pressure that are no longer present in today's highly mobile society (see 
Becker, 1991). Becker and Murphy view the government's ability to 
levy taxes as substitute to these social customs. Therefore, in a world in 
which capital markets cannot be relied on by capital-constrained fami-
lies to obtain adequate funds for schooling, this type of government 
intervention is welfare-improving. 
While the Becker-Murphy view of government intervention in edu-
cation and social security as substitute of older arrangements within 
families is in some respects appealing, it does presuppose the existence 
of perfect precommitment of future governments to the intergenera-
tional social compact. In practice, intergenerational cooperation is prob-
ably limited to some extent by the sequential nature of generational 
exchange and the self-interested nature of governments. It seems at least 
as reasonable to suppose, for example, that the current administration 
cannot commit future ones to the level of old-age support specified by 
the optimal social contract. In that case the only transfers which seem 
possible are those dictated by the selfish interests of the decisive gen-
eration. For the purposes of this paper this is taken to be the generation 
of workers —if students are not enfranchised and population grows, 
workers will be more numerous than retired owners of capital. In this 
world there is still a selfish motive for voluntary intergenerational trans-
fers to the young. This motive is provided in a closed economy by the 
fact that labor and capital are cooperating factors so that the return to RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS 7 
physical capital initially rises with investments in the schooling of the 
young. The same logic can be used to determine current rates of invest-
ment in the human capital of the young and in the stock of public 
capital. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
model. Section 3 analyzes golden rule investments in human capital, 
private physical capital and public capital. Section 4 derives second-
best optimal tax rules in a decentralized setting in which the govern-
ment must raise flat-rate taxes on all income in order to provide funds 
for schools and for investments in public capital. In section 5 these 
Ramsey rules are contrasted with endogenous taxes which a self-inter-
ested government would levy. Section 6 presents some concluding re-
marks. 
2. The Model 
Consider an economy of three-period lived overlapping generations 
defined over discrete time periods t=1,2,3 The size of generation t is 
N(t). Population grows at the rate n > 0: 
N(t+ l) = (l + H)JV(f) 
In the first period of life individuals specialize in schooling. In the 
second they supply to the labor market the skills acquired, receive labor 
income, pay taxes, consume, and save by acquiring physical assets. 
The raw time endowment in each of the first two periods of life is one. 
In the final period of life they retire and rely on accumulated assets to 
finance their consumption. The government collects taxes that are used 
to provide public education and public capital free of charge. 
The production technology for human capital accumulation is of 
the form: 
h(t + 1) = He(t), gh(t)) d>(0)=0, <|>' > 0, f < 0 (1) 
In (1), e{f) is the effort put by the individual and gh(t) is the per 
student level of government expenditure on human capital accumula-
tion at time t. Assuming the young do not care about leisure, they 10 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Viih) • {f(kp, k ) - (1 + n) • [kp +kg]} = (\ + n) (6) 
The Golden Rule consumption profile (C ~C ) satisfies MRS(C , C ) 
= (1 + «), for given (kp,kg,gh).
 P " " " 
PROPOSITION 1. Steady State Utility is maximized if the MRS of consump-
tion and the gross return of human and private and public physical 
capital are each equal to (1 + n), the gross rate of population growth. 
That is, welfare is maximized at: 
fx{kp, kg) = Y(g~h)»{f(kp, kg) - (1 + n)»[kp, kg]} =f2(kp, kg) = (1 + n). 
4. Decentralized Equilibrium: the Ramsey Problem with Uniform 
Income Taxes 
In general a member of generation t has preferences over consumption 
bundles (c^t), c2(t+ 1), c3(i+ 2)), where c.(t- 1 + i) denotes the con-
sumption of an individual belonging to generation t in periods ¿=1,2,3 
of her life. It is assumed that the consumption of young agents at t, c,(f), 
is zero. While simplifying things considerably, this assumption is in no 
way crucial for the results of this paper. Furthermore, assuming log-lin-
ear preferences, the utility function becomes u(c2, c3) = log(c2) 
+ B • log(c3), with B > 0. 
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to 
scale (CRS); specifically, 
Y(t) = kp(tf.kg(tf.L(t)\ (7) 
where a + p + 5 = 1 and a, p, 5 > 0. L(r) = N(t - 1) • h{t) is the stock of 
effective labor, h{t) is human capital, N{t- 1) is the labor force that 
equals the population of generation "t - 1" in this model. The constant 
returns to scale formulation has been tested by Aschauer (1989) and 
Munnell (1990). They have found that the sample data 1947-1985 for the 
US and 1970-1986 for the states of the US do not reject this hypothesis 
and, as such, we employ this specification. 
In the absence of lump-sum taxation the government must levy 
distortionary taxes. Here we assume that the government finances its RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS  11 
expenditure on human capital with revenues from taxation of all in-
come. At any time t, the government collects revenue to buy a flow of 
goods which are invested in public capital; also it does provide school-
ing to the generation just born. Given the length of a "period", we 
assume that all inputs to production depreciate completely, i.e. human 
capital cannot be "bequeathed" to future generations. Thus the govern-
ment budget constraint at any t is: 
G(t)={xh(t) + tk(t)}»Y{t), (8) 
where %h(t) and xt(i) are the shares of government expenditure in human 
and physical capital respectively. Define G\t) as the expenditure carried 
on generating human capital and G
k(t) the expenditure dedicated to 
provide public physical capital. Using these definitions, it is easy to show 
that 
gh{t) = G\t)/N(t) = ih{t)»kp(t)
a»kg(tf »gh(t- 1)V(1 + h), and (9) 
kgV+1) = G\t)/N{t).h(t + 1) = xk(tHp(t)
a»kg(tf»(gh(t- \)/gh{t)? (10) 
where equation (10) represents the public physical capital per effective 
labor. By substituting (9) into (10) we obtain 
kit + 1)=[T.(0 • k (t)
a /(1" »»gh(t - 1)
Y(
1







Let s = 5/(1 - B) be the savings rate. Then from the loan market equi-
librium we have that 
S
p(f) = KP(t + 1) = s • N(t - 1) • [1 - xA(r) - xk(t)] • w(t) • h(t). 
Using the identity 
L(f + 1) /L(t) = N(t) • gh(t)i/N(t- Y)*gh(f- l)
y 
into (11) results in: 12 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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To simplify, define 








Using these definitions, equations (9), (11) and (12) become 
gh(t) = Bl . kp(t)





Y).g/i(i- l)T/0-K).jk (i)P/H-fl (15) 
kp{f+ 1) = J?3 .k^tf'V-V'ghit- i)T/(i-u (/)P/(i-7) (i6) 
Equation (14)-(16) depict the equilibrium sequences, 
{g/i(f),yi+ l),*p(f + 1)}. Using (14) and (15), we obtain 
kp(t+ 1) = {gfc(r+ 1)
1/
H
 .BitPC -v)- n/«}/{fi2P
/« .^(ijMi -M + H'«} 
Plugging it into (16) we see that expenditure on human capital per 
student obeys the following equation: 













 P) + a + p 
which converges to the log steady state if y(l - a - p) + <x + p < land it 
is satisfied as long as y< 1. Taking logarithms and evaluating at the 
steady state, we obtain 
loglgA) = {a • log(B3) + p • log(S2) + [y(a + p) 
+ (1 - a - p)] •log(51)}/{(l _ 7) .(i _ a - p)} (17) RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS 13 
Similarlyifc and* become: 
\og{kp) = log(£3) - (1 - y) • log(Bl) + (1 - y) • \og(gh), and (18) 
log(*p = {- log(Sl) - a • log(ifcj>) + (1 - Y) • log(*A)}/p (19) 
Equations (17), (18) and (19) describe the steady state (gh, k k ) 
triplet.
 g 
4.1. The Optimal Taxation Problem 
Let V(f- 1) be the indirect utility function of generation "t- 1" (disre-
garding any constants): 
V(t- 1) = log{[l - xh{f) - xt(i)] »w(f) • A(0) 
+ B»log{[l -xh(t)-xk(t)] »[1
 !> 
-xt(i+l)].w(f)-A(i)T(i+l)} 
In steady state V, xh, xk, w,h,r,k,k are all constant and V can be 
written as ' * 
V(t-l) = log[(l -xh-xk)»wh] + B'log[(l -xh-xkf»wh»r] (20) 




h = ghf 
(17), (18), (19), and the set of definitions (13). 
The solution to this problem leads to the following proposition: 14 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose public investments on education and physical 
capital are financed by a proportional tax on income and the government 
budget is balanced each period. Then: 
(a) The optimal tax rate that maximizes steady state utility is: 
T' = Y»(1 -«-p) + P. 
(b) The shares of human and (public) physical capital investments to 
output are: x\ = y • (1 - a - p) and x\ = p. 
PROOF. See appendix. 
Note that the optimal tax rates are independent of the discount 
factor. In the Ramsey equilibrium the fraction of national income allo-
cated to public schooling and public physical capital is x'. Nations with 
higher savings rates optimally invest a greater fraction of their income 
in human capital and public physical capital and enjoy higher standards 
of living both because their workforces are better educated and because 
non-human capital (private and public) per unit of effective labor is 
greater. 
5. Endogenous Provision of Schooling and Public Capital 
This section investigates the tax rates selected and investments in school-
ing and public capital chosen by a self-interested government repre-
senting the middle-aged workers. Each middle-aged and each old 
individual in this economy has one vote. By assumption, the young are 
not enfranchised. Thus, the electoral process involves only the middle 
aged and the older generations. Since we assume that the rate of popula-
tion growth is positive, the decisive voters are the middle-aged individu-
als. The government will impose taxes only in order to raise the lifetime 
utility of the generation it represents. In the absence of altruism or 
intergenerational social contracts, the only reason for such transfers to 
the young is that the productivity of physical capital which the decisive 
generation depends on during retirement to finance consumption rises 
with investments in human and public capital. At any "r", w(t), h(t), 
k (t), k (t) are known to these individuals. Moreover, although xh(t+ 1) 
and x/t + 1) are unknown at "t", the decisive generation does not have RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS 15 
control over these tax rates (i.e. they are fixed). At t + 1 the next genera-
tion (born at "i") will set the optimal values ofxh(t + 1) and xk(t + 1). The 
decisive generation only chooses how much to tax to themselves and the 
old at Thus, individuals maximize 
V = (1 + B) • log(l - TA(f) - xt(f)) + B • log(r(i + 1)) 
{yo,yo} 
s. t. log(/-(f + ])) oc (a - 1) • log(* (f + 1)) + p • log(* (f + 1)) and equa-
tions (13), (15) and (16).
 g 
This problem has an interior solution with xh(t) + xk(t) < 1 and xA(0, 
xk(t) > 0. Proposition 3 establishes this result: 
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose public investment in education and physical 
capital are financed by a proportional tax on income and the government 
budget is balanced each period. Then: 
a) The optimal tax rate that maximizes the lifetime utility of the decisive 
or median voter is: 
x'(t) = B[y(l - a - p) + p]/[l + B • y • (1 - a - p) + B • (a + p)] 
b) xh{t)* =B»y{\ -a-p)/[l + B .y(l - a - p) + B .(a + p)] and 
xk(t)' = B • p/[l + B«Y"(l-a-P) + B»(o+ P)]. 
PROOF. See appendix. 
The model allows us to estimate and simultaneously for both, the 
Ramsey and the Endogenous cases. The calibration of the model fol-
lows from the assumption that the observed shares of government ex-
penditures on human and physical capital to Gross National Product, 
GNP, are drawn from an environment where a majority voting rule is 
followed and each individual casts a single vote (excluding the young). 
The observed average shares of these expenditures for the Consolidated 
Government are 5% for the public investment on human capital forma-
tion (encompassing only education) and 7% for public physical provi-
sion for the period 1965-1989 (US Department of Commerce, 1986). 16 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Public physical investment is defined as a residual. From the total 
government expenditure we deducted the expenditures on welfare, in-
terest payments, education, health, and hospitals, labor training, veter-
ans and national defense. We take a value of a = 0.33 and B = 1. Thus, 
solving the pair of equations in proposition 3 for p and y under the 
above assumptions yield: y = 0.135 and p = 0.106. The optimal tax rates 
for the Ramsey problem under these values of the parameters gives us: 
x"h = 0.076 and x*k = 0.106. These optimal tax rates also indicate the 
optimal shares of government investments on human and physical capi-
tal respectively. The underprovision amounts up to 2.6 percentage 
points of theGNPfor human formation and up to 3.6 percentage points 
for public physical capital provision. 
Under the assumption that the observed shares of government ex-
penditure are drawn from a Ramsey type economy, the estimated values 
of y and p are: y = 0.083 and p = 0.07. The endogenous optimal tax rates 
under these parameters are x\ = 0.048 and x\ = 0.034. 
Independent estimates of y and p have been obtained in the litera-
ture. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics on white 
men between the ages of 30 and 55, Akin and Garfinkel (1977) found 
that school quality (as measured by average school expenditures in the 
states the person grew up) contributes significantly to earnings. They 
report an elasticity of earnings with respect to school expenditures of 
0.2038, that is, y = 0.2038. Aschauer (1989), on the other hand, reports 
that the elasticity of output with respect to the stock of public capital, 
(p in our notation) ranges between 0.36 and 0.39 for the US from 1949 
to 1985, while Munnell (1990) reports p = 0.15 using US regional data. 
Clearly, the values of the parameters estimated in the first case are 
much closer to those provided by the empirical evidence just men-
tioned. The value of y = 0.135 from the endogenous case compares well 
with Akin and Garfinkels estimate. The estimated values of range from 
0.083 to 0.106. These appear to be low compared to the values esti-
mated by Aschauer (1989). However, we should note two things: a) to 
the extent that his formulation did not include a measure of human 
capital (or effective labor), his estimation may be biased upward; this is 
so since labor force productivity would be underestimated, and b) he 
assumes that the flow of government physical capital or services can be 
represented by the stock of public capital. If, as Barro (1990) argues, the 
flow of government productive services is proportional to the stock of RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS 17 
public capital, then the estimated range of p by Aschauer (1989) pro-
vides an upper bound (with the constant of proportionality equal to 
one). Indeed, we argue that taking into account these two observations 
would significantly reduce. Moreover, it is closer to the estimated value 
presented by Munnell (1990). 
The above discussion can be summarized by the following tables. 
Table 1 
Uniform Income Taxation 
Endogenous environment: B = 1, p = 0.106, y= 0.135, a = 0.33 





* Indicates optimal tax rate. 
Table 2 
Uniform Income Taxation 
Ramsey environment: B = 1, p = 0.07, y = 0.083, a = 0.33. 





* Indicates optimal tax rate. 
The underprovision result presented in tables 1 and 2 are described 
in proposition 4. 
PROPOSITION 4. A democratic society that finances government expendi-
tures by means of a uniform tax on income and that keeps a balanced 
budget, may be underinvesting in human and public physical capital 
formation relative to the second best. 
From the optimal tax rates found in the last two sections, which are 
reproduced here for comparison: 18 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
xj* = B • y • (1 - o - p)/[l + B»Y»(l-o-P) + fl»(o + P)],xf 
=B • p/[l + B.Y»(l-a-p) + B.(a + p)], 
tf = Y»(1 -a-p) and if = p 
The superscripts e and /? refer to the endogenous and the Ramsey 
(second best) cases respectively. By simple examination, the statements 
z
e
h* < xf and x
e* < xf are always true. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provided an assessment of the intergenerational impacts of 
public expenditures for education and infrastructure capital in an inte-
grated general equilibrium model. These impacts are important because 
they shape future living standards and the growth performance of the 
economy and because there is a presumption that capital market imper-
fections and externalities result in underprovision of both schooling and 
infrastructure capital by the private sector and (in modern times) by 
capital-constrained families. 
The paper provides an analysis of both a cooperative view of the 
politics of intergenerational exchange and public choice perspective. 
The former view argues that government intervention forces an implicit 
social contract among generations. This contract results in the imple¬
, mentation of (second best) Ramsey taxes which raise welfare over 
levels achieved via selfish generational behavior. The second view as-
sumes that the decisive generation cannot be effectively punished in the 
future if it violates the social compact and that it provides public funds 
for schooling and infrastructure only to the extent motivated by selfish 
considerations. 
Calibration of the model implies that the selfish view seems to 
generate parameters that are more in line with labor estimates of the 
importance of school quality on earnings than the optimal contract view. 
Observed patterns of public expenditures on schools and infrastructure 
were thus interpreted as having been derived from the noncooperative 
regime. Using these values of the productivity of each type of public 
expenditure along with the Ramsey taxation rule results in a recommen-RAMSEY VS. PUBLIC CHOICE PATHS 19 
dation to raise public spending on schools and infrastructure from about 
12 percent of GNPto slightly more than 18 percent. Such an expenditure 
will raise growth and living standards even if no externalities due to 
schooling or public capital are present. 
Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Uniform Tax on Income: Ramsey Problem. 
V= {[a .(1 - p) + (1 - y) »(1 - a- p)(l + B)] 
/[(I -Y) •(! - a- p)]} »log[(l -T^-TJ)] 
+ {[(l+B)> p]/[(l - Y) • (1 - a - p)]} • logCcp 
+ {[(1 + B) »y(l - a- p)]/[(l - Y) »(1 - a-p)]} «logC^) 
Define the coefficient of log[(l -th- %k)] as C; the coefficient of 
logeg as D, and the coefficient of log(i ) as A. The first order condition 
implies that: 
- (A + C)xh - A%k + A = 0 (1.1) 
-Dxk-(D+C)T
h + D = 0 (1.2) 
After some manipulations, 
A + C = [(1 + B) • (1 + p)]/[(l - Y) • (1 - a - P)L 
D+ C= (1 +B) »[l - Y»(1 - a- P)]/[(l - Y) •(! - a - P)]. 
Using (1.1), (1.2) and the above expressions, the optimal tax rates 
become: 
T; = y.(i-cc-p) and t* = p 20 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Uniform Tax on Income: Endogenous Case. 
The problem of the young agent can be rewritten as: 
Max V= [(1 + fi «o)] «log[(l - TA(i) - T4(0)] 
+ [B • y • (1 - a - P)] • log(Tfc(f)) + [B • p] • log(Tt(<)) 
TheFONCare: 
-[l+B»a + B»Y»(l-cc-P)] •ih(t) - [15 »Y»(1 - a - P)] 
+ [B *Y
#(1
 _ a _ P)l = 0 (1-3) 
- [1 + B »(a + P)] •tjt(i) - fi »p »1^(0 + B »p = 0 (1.4) 
Solving for tt(0 from (1.4): 
t^(r) — B * p/[l + B • (oc + p)] — B • p/[l + B * (oc + p)] • t^(0 (1-5) 
and substituting it into (1.3), the optimal tax rate for human capital 
investment is: 
Tfc(i)* = B«Y«(l - o- p)/[l + B«Y«(1 -o - P) + fl«(o + p)]. 
Substituting xh(t)
m into (1.5), results in: 
T (f)* = fi • p/[l + fi «Y«(1 - a - P) + B «(a + P)J. 
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